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Abstract
ELIE can be interpreted as a minimum income scheme, ﬁnanced by lump-sum taxes. It may induce
social waste as individuals with a low taste for working may opt for voluntary unemployment. We
simulate the magnitude of this social waste with microdata for Belgium and compare ELIE with a ﬁrst-
best scheme and a second-best scheme (based on a linear income tax), implementing the same minimum
income. As expected, the social waste induced by ELIE is intermediate between the social waste
induced by the ﬁrst- and second-best schemes. Assumptions about the preferences of the voluntarily
unemployed play a crucial role.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Serge-Christophe Kolm’s (2005) book Macrojustice (MJ in the sequel) is concerned with “the most general
rules of society and their application to the distribution of the beneﬁts from the main resources” (MJ,
p.1). Kolm rejects the traditional welfarist approach to income taxation and substitutes for it an ideal
of equal freedom. Given the crucial importance of the freedom to act, taxes and transfers must be based
on so-called inelastic items, i.e., items which are not aﬀected by individual actions. In Kolm’s view these
inelastic items must be the productive capacities of the individuals. He then proposes an operational
tax-beneﬁt scheme, called ELIE (equal-labour income equalization). The basic idea of ELIE is simple.
Society ﬁxes an amount of "initial equal labour" and distributes all the proceeds from working this amount
of labour equally over all individuals. This equally distributed amount can be interpreted as a kind of
minimum income. Individuals with a productivity smaller than the average in society receive a transfer,
individuals with a larger than average productivity have to pay a tax. Each individual keeps full freedom
to choose her actual amount of labour time and may keep for herself the income resulting from working
more than the “initial equal labour”.
The basic motivation for ELIE is an ethical one, i.e., the importance of respecting the freedom to act.
However, in Kolm’s view, ELIE also has attractive incentive properties. It is basically a tax on wages,
not on incomes, and it is incentive-compatible for all those who are working more than the “initial equal
labour”: indeed, for them, additional units of labour remain untaxed and earn an additional income equal
to the individual’s productivity. However, there are two potential problems with this argumentation.
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1First, it assumes that wages are perfectly observable for all those who are working. While it is true that
there is now reasonably reliable information on wages available, or that wages can be calculated from
observations on income and on labour time, one may fear that this information could become much less
reliable when ELIE were to be introduced. Second (as acknowledged by Kolm himself), the incentive-
compatibility argumentation does not go through for those who work less than the "initial equal labour",
including the (in)voluntarily unemployed. These can get a minimum income if they do not work at all,
and therefore may have an incentive to hide their true productivity.
In this paper we do not focus on the basic ethical foundations of ELIE, but on these incentive issues.
Moreover, we will take it for granted that wages are observable for those who are working more than
the initial equal labour and we will only focus on the issue of voluntary unemployment, linked to the
minimum income feature of ELIE. In section 2, we propose a simple model of the labour market, which is
very similar to Kolm’s model. We introduce three tax-beneﬁt schemes: (1) a ﬁrst best ELIE scheme, in
which productive capacities are perfectly known, (2) Kolm’s ELIE scheme with waste, in which productive
capacities are perfectly known for the working population, but not for the (in)voluntarily unemployed,
and (3) a traditional second-best (linear) income tax scheme, in which incomes are observed and taxed
but productive capacities are not known. We show how ELIE may induce social waste. This immediately
raises the (empirical) question of the amount of waste induced. In section 3, we simulate the results for
the three tax schemes with Belgian microdata. It turns out that the social waste in Kolm’s ELIE scheme
is intermediate between the other ones (as expected) and its relative magnitude is highly sensitive to some
of the assumptions, especially to the taste of the voluntarily unemployed. Section 4 concludes.
2 Does ELIE induce waste? Three minimum income schemes
To explain the eﬀects of the ELIE tax-beneﬁt scheme, we propose a stylized model of the labour market
–which is similar to Kolm’s model (see, e.g., MJ, ch. 9-10, 144-184). We assume that individuals diﬀer
both in their productive capacities (= constant marginal productivities) and in their preferences for leisure.
Tastes and productivities are assumed to be independently distributed. The continuous density function
of the productive capacities w ≥ 0 is given by f (with f>0 on R+). Each individual belongs to one
of a discrete number of taste types i ∈ N = {1,2,...,n}.W e u s e pi > 0 to denote the proportion of
individuals with taste type i ∈ N. To simplify the analysis we assume that preferences are quasi-linear in
consumption. Summarizing, we have:
Assumption A1:G r o s si n c o m ey equals w , i.e., a multiplication of individual productivity w ≥ 0 and
(adjusted) labour   ≥ 0, which is itself a function of labour duration, intensity, speed, and so on (MJ,
ch.9, p.145).1
Assumption A2: Individuals have preferences over consumption and labour. They like consumption (net
income) c = y + t,w i t ht a transfer, they dislike labour  , and preferences are strictly convex (MJ, ch.9,
ﬁgure 9-1, p.157). More speciﬁcally, the preferences of each taste type i ∈ N = {1,2,...,n} can be





ε ,w i t hε>0 the labour supply elasticity and
αi > 0 a taste (or ambition) parameter.
Assumption A3: Tastes and productivities are independently distributed.
1Note that –in contrast with Kolm (MJ, ch.9, p.145)– we do not restrict   to be bounded in some interval, say [0,1].
2Note that the preference speciﬁcation in A2 excludes income eﬀects, i.e., giving an amount of money to
an individual does not change her labour supply decision (see, e.g., Atkinson, 1990; Diamond, 1998). A
further consequence of assumption A2 is that individuals end up with either y>0, >0 (and thus w>0
must hold for these individuals) or y =   =0(with w>0 for the voluntarily unemployed and w =0for
the involuntarily unemployed). Other combinations of y and   are not possible. As a matter of deﬁnition,
individuals with a ‘real’ productivity w =0are said to be involuntarily unemployed (irrespective of  );
the voluntarily unemployed are deﬁned as individuals with a productivity w>0 who choose   =0 .
Traditional tax theory assumes that gross income y (= w ) is observable, while productive capacity w
is not. A linear income transfer system with a uniform lump sum transfer B and a constant marginal tax
rate τ c a nt h e nb ed e ﬁned as follows:
linear income tax: Tτ : w  7→ B − τw ,w i t hB = τ
R ∞
0 (w )f (w)dw
On the other hand, ELIE assumes that the productivities w are observable, either directly, e.g. from
a paysheet, or indirectly, by observing y = w  and  , and dividing both (MJ, ch.10, p.172). We assume
that, if the paysheet reveals w, then it also reveals both y and  ,w i t hw = y/ . As a consequence, we can
write the transfer as t = T (y/ ),w i t hT a function of ‘real’ productivity. If (all the) wages are perfectly
observed, we deﬁne the ﬁrst best ELIE transfer scheme for a given parameter k ≥ 0 as follows:
first best ELIE: TFB
k : y/  7→ k(w − y/ ),w i t hw =
R ∞
0 wf (w)dw,
where a budget constraint has been imposed such that the average ELIE-transfer is equal to zero. Note
that the parameter k determines the degree of redistribution and plays therefore an analogous role as τ in
the linear income tax, while the minimum income kw is analogous to the uniform lump sum transfer B.
If one wants to implement the ﬁrst-best ELIE scheme, one immediately faces the problem that y/  is
not well-deﬁned when y =   =0 . This raises the issue of what productivity should be ascribed to the
(voluntarily and involuntarily) unemployed, and therefore the issue of what transfer they should receive.
Kolm proposes that for the application of ELIE, an individual i facing the labour market constraint
 i 6  0
i should be interpreted as having a productive capacity wi =0for  i >  0
i; the involuntarily
unemployed (with  0
i =0 )t h u sh a v ewi =0 . But since we cannot distinguish between voluntarily
and involuntarily unemployed, we deﬁne the ‘revealed’ productivity b w equal to 0, whenever y =   =0
(Kolm, MJ, ch.13, p. 215). Of course, this redeﬁnition implies that the budget requirement also has





w| i(w)>0 wf (w)dw ≤ w,w i t h i (w) the labour choice of an individual with taste type i
and productivity w. The ELIE transfer scheme then becomes
ELIE with social waste :
TSW
k : y/  7→ k
³
b w − y/ 
´
,w i t hy/ 
def





wf (w)dw.( 1 )
Equation (1) immediately shows the reason for the terminology “ELIE with social waste”. Indeed, it
is obvious that individuals can hide their ‘true’ productivity w by not working and thus revealing a
productivity b w =0 . In fact, Figure 1 (with labour, not leisure, on the horizontal axis) shows that not
working (and therefore hiding her productivity), resulting in the minimum income kw, may be beneﬁcial
for an individual with productivity w>0, i.e. may yield a higher utility level than working and getting
3the income yi = kw + w( i − k). Of course, if there are individuals shirking, the budget constraint will













Figure 1: It might be beneﬁcial to hide your true productivity.
Since individuals can only choose to reveal their true productivity (choose b w = w)o rt oh i d ei t( c h o o s e
b w =0≤ w), our model is a peculiar case of Dasgupta and Hammond (1980), in which individuals can
choose to work at (and reveal) any productivity level b w ≤ w. Given the speciﬁc structure of the ELIE
scheme as displayed in Figure 1, it is always the case that, if it is beneﬁcial for someone with a productivity
w>0 to hide it and to work at a lower rate b w,w i t h0 < b w<w , then it is optimal for this individual
to choose to reveal b w =0 . Therefore, the current model with two discrete choices b w = w and b w =0is
suﬃcient to capture the essential features of Dasgupta and Hammond (1980).
We will now further analyse the labour market equilibrium if Kolm’s ELIE is implemented. Individual
decisions are linked to each other through the budget requirement. Letting I (·) denote an indicator
function which equals 1 in case the statement between brackets is true, and zero otherwise, we deﬁne:




n) of maps  ∗
i : R+ → R+ : w 7→  ∗
i (w), one for each taste type i ∈ N, such that, for each
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i (w)>0 wf (w)dw.
Note that, since individuals with taste type i and productivity w are assumed to be ‘atomic’, i.e., their
proportion is negligible with respect to the total population, they cannot inﬂuence b w by choosing   diﬀerent
from  ∗
i (w), and thus b w also appears at the right-hand side of equation (2).
The next proposition shows the existence of a unique labour supply equilibrium. It is completely deﬁned
by cut-oﬀ productivity levels w◦
i for i ∈ N, such that (1) individuals with taste type i and a productivity
w ≤ w◦
i choose to hide their true productivity and thus to remain voluntarily (if w>0) or involuntarily
(if w =0 ) unemployed, while (2) individuals with taste type i and a productivity w>w ◦
i choose to reveal
their true productivity and thus to work. The proof of the proposition is given in the appendix.
Proposition: If assumptions A1-A3 hold, then there exists a unique labour supply equilibrium ( ∗
1,...,  ∗
n)
for the ELIE transfer scheme deﬁned in equation (1) such that each individual with taste type i ∈ N and
‘real’ productivity w chooses  ∗
i (w)=0if w ≤ w◦
i =
k1/ε(1+ε)1/ε
αi and  ∗
i (w)=wεαε
i,o t h e r w i s e .
4The social waste, induced by ELIE, is caused by the fact that some individuals prefer to shirk, i.e., to
get voluntarily unemployed, if they are entitled to a minimum income when they do not work at all.
The amount of social waste will then be determined by the (shirking) cut-oﬀ levels w◦
i. As expected, these
increase with k, and hence with the level of the minimum income. They decrease with the taste for working
αi. Indeed, as was already illustrated by Figure 1, the crucial condition for shirking is that the utility of
shirking with income k b w, is larger than the utility of working  ∗
i (w)(> 0) with income w ∗
i (w)+k(b w−w).
It is therefore clear that in a realistic setting, the minimum income scheme implied by ELIE induces
some social waste. The crucial question now becomes how much social waste is induced. The next section
provides an estimate, based on a (somewhat rough) calibration and simulation exercise for Belgium.
3 How much waste is induced? An empirical analysis
We base our simulation study on the individual observations available in the last wave of the Panel Study
of Belgian Households (1992-2002). We calibrate the parameters of our model so as to replicate as well
as possible these individual data (subsection 3.1). We then show in subsection 3.2 the results for the
benchmark values of the parameters. The most interesting insights are obtained from the sensitivity
analysis in subsection 3.3.
3.1 Data and calibration
We restrict ourselves to the individuals in the potential workforce. The latter is deﬁned as consisting of
those individuals who either (1) have work (possibly temporarily suspended), or (2) who do not have work,
but are neither retired, nor sick, nor handicapped, and so on. Total sample size of the potential workforce
is equal to 3789 individuals. Unemployment among the potential workforce equals 22.8%. Figure 2 presents
a kernel density estimate of labour supply (in actual hours worked per week) for the working population
only. The ‘typical’ peaks around half-time and full-time, together with the large group of unemployed (not
t a k e nu pi nﬁgure 2) suggest to use three taste types, αL (low) αM (medium) and αH (high), for those
voluntarily not working (  =0 ), those working in between 0 and 30 hours a week (0 < ≤ 30)a n dt h o s e
w o r k i n gm o r et h a n3 0h o u r saw e e k(  >30), respectively; the taste values used in the simulation will
be calibrated later on. The data do not allow us to distinguish the involuntarily employed (with w =0 )
from the voluntarily unemployed (with 0 <w6 w◦
i ). We therefore deﬁne a parameter β, indicating the
fraction of the voluntarily unemployed in the total group of the unemployed (22.8% of the sample). In our
benchmark simulation we (arbitrarily) put β =0 .5. The proportions of individuals in the diﬀerent groups
are then equal to pL =0 .114, pM =0 .123 and pH =0 .649; the proportion of involuntarily unemployed is
denoted p0 =( 1− β)0.228 = 0.114.
Figure 2a shows a density estimate of the logarithm of ‘revealed’ gross hourly wages b w for the employed.
If we assume that no one has an incentive to reveal a productivity b w in (0,w), the revealed productivities of
the employed must correspond to their true productivities. The distribution is approximately normal with
a sample mean and standard deviation equal to 2.65 and 0.36, respectively; this corresponds with a mean
gross hourly wage equal to €15. Note that lognormality cannot be statistically rejected (Shapiro-Wilk
test). In Figure 2b we look at the logarithmic wage density again, but now separately for the medium
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Figure 2b: Kernel estimates of the gross hourly log wage density for the medium and high taste types.
Equality of both distributions cannot be statistically rejected (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test), which gives
some support for our independence hypothesis between productivity and taste levels (assumption A3).
Finally, the current Belgian net income scheme –which maps gross into net incomes (exclusive of social
beneﬁts)2– can be very well approximated by a loglinear scheme. Figure 3 plots the logarithm of net
income versus the logarithm of gross income and shows a tight log-linear ﬁtg i v e nb yc ≈ 1.42y0.76 (the
explained variance equals 89%).
Let us now combine all the previous information in order to calibrate the three taste values αi,w i t h
i = L,M,H.T h et a s t et y p e sαM and αH are calibrated to ensure that the theoretically predicted mean
labour hours per week, given the ‘estimated’ actual Belgian net income scheme c ≈ 1.42y0.76,i se q u a l
to the observed mean labour hours per week for both types (23.9 and 41.4 hours/week respectively).
Recall that all individuals are endowed with a preference technology as in assumption A2. We assume
that the elasticity of labour supply ε is the same for everyone and equal to 0.25, which lies within the
range of plausible empirical estimates (see Blundell & MaCurdy, 1999). Since the ‘true’ productivities are
independently distributed from the taste types, the productivity distribution is the same for each taste
type and given by F : w → f (w) with F (0) = p0 =0 .114 (the proportion of involuntarily unemployed),
and F(w)=0 .114+(1 − 0.114)G(w) for w>0,w i t hG a lognormal distribution function with mean 2.65
and standard deviation equal to 0.36 (to mimick Figure 2a).
2Notice that, given quasi-linear preferences in income, there are no income eﬀects and thus, labour supply decisions
are not inﬂuenced by lump-sum social transfers. (However, some social transfers are not lump-sum –e.g., unemployment
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Figure 3: The Belgian tax system is approximately loglinear.
We then still have to ﬁxav a l u ef o rαL, i.e. the preference parameter for those who are voluntarily
unemployed. By deﬁnition these are individuals with w>0. To calibrate αL,w ea s s u m et h a tt h e yw o u l d
just ‘survive’ in a laisser-faire economy, where survival means working 10 hours a week (which would
provide them on average with a (net and gross) income equal to C =603.68 per month). This assumption
results in αL (10) ≈ 178150.
We will now ﬁrst show the results for the benchmark case. Remember that we made three crucial
assumptions about the benchmark parameters: we have assumed that β (the fraction of the voluntarily
unemployed in the total unemployed) =0 .5, that these voluntarily unemployed would be able to just
survive in a laissez-faire economy (αL (10) ≈ 178150), and that the elasticity of labour supply ε =0 .25.
We will show in subsection 3.3 the results of a sensitivity analysis with respect to each of these assumptions.
3.2 Results for the benchmark case
Figure 4a shows gross income per capita (in € per month) as a function of the implementable minimum
income k b w (in € per month). Figure 4b shows the welfare losses induced by the diﬀerent schemes as a
percentage of gross income. In 2002-2003 the actual minimum income in Belgium for a single individual
was about €600 per month. This corresponds to redistributing the value of one day work per week and
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Figure 4b: Eﬃciency cost as a function of minimum income, given ε =0 .25 & β =0 .5 & αL (10).
9If ELIE could be implemented in a ﬁrst-best way, there would be no eﬃciency cost to society.3 This
ﬁrst best gross income per capita is given by the horizontal solid line in Figure 4a. The second-best (linear
income tax) scheme shows gross income per capita for a linear income tax scheme which implements the
same minimum income, i.e., with B = k b w. I nt h i sc a s e ,t h e r ei so fc o u r s ea ne ﬃciency cost related to
the imposition of a marginal tax rate τ. Figure 4b shows that this cost increases almost linearly, and
becomes about 6% of gross income for a minimum income of €600/month. We are most interested in
the eﬀects of the realistic ELIE scheme (1). For very low values of k b w there is no eﬃciency cost at all,
because all those with w>0 prefer to work. However, once the minimum income approaches €350 per
month, the group with the lowest taste type is moving from working to not-working. From about €500
onwards, all individuals with a low taste for work have become voluntarily unemployed, and thus, gross
income remains stable again. Admittedly, this is somewhat artiﬁcial, as it follows from our assumption of
a discrete number of taste types. Yet, assuming more taste types would only smooth Figures 4a and 4b.
To give an idea how such a smooth scheme would look like, we added in Figure 4b a polynomial trend
line through the ELIE-values. The basic message remains the same: ELIE induces social waste, but for
the benchmark values of our parameters it is still a considerable improvement compared to the current
practice of second-best. At a minimum income of €600/month, the eﬃciency cost of ELIE is about 2%,
i.e., one third of the eﬃciency cost of the linear income tax.
3.3 Sensitivity results
We now analyze to what extent the previous results are sensitive to the main choices: the labour supply
elasticity ε, the proportion of voluntarily unemployed β, and the low taste type αL.I ne a c ho ft h e s ec a s e s
we only show the welfare cost as a % of gross income, for diﬀerent levels of the minimum income.
We start with the elasticity of labour supply ε. Figures 5a and 5b present the same simulation as
in ﬁgure 4b, but with ε equal to 0.125 (half the benchmark) or 0.5 (double the benchmark). Changing
ε has the expected inﬂuence on the incentive cost of the linear income tax, which varies between 4%
(for ε =0 .125) and 7% (for ε =0 .5) for a minimum income of €600/month. The eﬀect on the social
waste induced by ELIE goes in the other direction: the larger ε, the (relatively) closer ELIE comes to the
ﬁrst-best. Notice ﬁrst that the gross income share of the (potentially) voluntarily unemployed is equal
to
pL(αL)ε
pL(αL)ε+pM(αM)ε+pH(αH)ε in a laisser-faire economy. The larger ε, the lower their production share.
But while in the linear income tax case all taste types continuously reduce their labour supply when
the minimum income increases, this is not the case for ELIE, in which the low taste types decide to
become unemployed when the minimum income becomes suﬃciently high. Therefore, increasing ε brings
the waste induced by ELIE (relatively) closer to the incentive cost of the ﬁrst-best ELIE scheme. In fact,
for ε =0 .125, both costs are similar for reasonable values of the minimum income. For large ε,E L I Ei s
much more eﬃcient that the linear income tax.
The next two ﬁgures 6a and 6b show the sensitivity with respect to β (the proportion of voluntarily
unemployed) by changing it to respectively 0.25 and 0.75. If β were equal to 0, there would be only
involuntary unemployment, i.e. all unemployed would have w =0 , and ELIE would induce no waste.
In fact, the eﬃciency cost for ELIE remains small for β =0 .25. For increasing values of β,t h ew a s t e
induced by ELIE increases, while the eﬃciency cost of the linear income tax slightly decreases. The latter
3Of course, this holds as long as participation constraints –the constraint that the utility of working should be higher
than the utility of the bundle (c, )=( 0 ,0)– are not binding.
10phenomenon is due to the fact that the increase in β is linked to an increase in the number of individuals
with w>0. Therefore, the same level of minimum income can be ﬁnanced with a lower tax rate τ.F o r
β =0 .75, the welfare cost of ELIE approaches that of the linear income tax at a minimum income of
€500/month, but the diﬀerences grow larger again for higher values of the minimum income.
F i n a l l y ,r e c a l lt h a tt h eb e n c h m a r kv a l u ef o rt h el o wt a s t et y p eαL is chosen such that these individuals
–who are voluntarily employed in the data– would ‘survive’ in a laisser-faire economy, where survival
means working 10 hours a week. This assumption provides them a (net and gross) income equal to C =603.68
per month. We change our assumptions about αL and assume that in a laissez-faire economy the low
taste types would work either 5 hours a week (earning on average C =301.84 p e rm o n t h )o r1 5h o u r saw e e k
(earning C =905.52 per month), respectively. Figures 7a and 7b present the results. The assumption on the
taste type of the voluntarily unemployed is crucial. In case of αL (5), the low taste types choose to be
unemployed already from a minimum income of C =200 onwards, but the welfare cost of ELIE then stays
constant at about 1.2% of gross income. In the case of αL (15), the choice to shirk is postponed until
C =550, but then the welfare cost of ELIE is increasing faster, because the voluntarily unemployed work
harder in the counterfactual situation without shirking. Still, at a minimum income of C =750/month, the
welfare cost of ELIE is only half that of the linear income tax.
4C o n c l u s i o n
Kolm (2005) largely focuses on the situation of individuals working more than the “initial equal labour
time” k, because he considers this to be the true realm of macrojustice. In economies with a large unem-
ployment rate, however, there is a considerable fraction of the population that works less than k.S o m e
of these will be voluntarily unemployed, and, in fact, ELIE may induce some voluntary unemployment
because it grants all unemployed individuals at least a minimum income. In this paper we analysed the
resulting incentive problems and we used Belgian microdata to get a better idea about the empirical sig-
niﬁcance of the phenomenon. It turns out that it is not negligible. Yet, for reasonable parameter values,
the welfare cost of ELIE is (much) smaller than the welfare loss induced by a linear income tax which
would grant the same minimum income. As expected, a crucial role is played by the assumptions made
about the preferences of the unemployed.
The relevancy of our work for “Macrojustice” should be put into perspective. First, incentive issues
are not the main argument in favour of ELIE. To some extent, they are only a byproduct. Our analysis
does not add anything to or detract from Kolm’s ethical argumentation in terms of freedom. Second, in
Kolm’s overall view, ELIE is only part of a set of coherent policy proposals, which also include traditional
unemployment insurance and a change in labour market policies. Our analysis captures only one aspect
of this broader program, and the results might be diﬀerent in a broader setting. Third, our ﬁnding that
preferences are important raises interesting issues related to Kolm’s view on (macro)justice as a third best,
where the ﬁrst best would be a society in which individuals are suﬃciently able to control the birth of
their desires and the second best would be a society in which people suﬃciently like each other to remove
all conﬂicts about sharing scarce resources. In such a broader view on society and on human beings,
preferences can certainly no longer be seen as exogenous. Our results suggest that more research going
beyond a narrow view on individual preferences, could also throw a clearer light on the strengths and
limitations of ELIE.











































ELIE second-best Poly. (ELIE)











































ELIE second-best Poly. (ELIE)
Figure 5b: Eﬃciency cost as a function of the minimum income, given ε =0 .5 & β =0 .5 & αL (10).
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Figure 6b: Eﬃciency cost as a function of the minimum income, given ε =0 .25 & β =0 .75 & αL (10).
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Figure 7b: Eﬃciency cost as a function of the minimum income, given ε =0 .25 & β =0 .5 & αL (15).
14Proof of proposition 1
First, we show that, irrespective of the taste type i ∈ N,( 1 ) ∗
i (0) = 0 and (2) if  ∗
i (w) > 0 for some
w>0,t h e n ∗
i (w0) > 0 for all w0 ≥ w. Both (1) and (2) together imply the existence of a unique cut-oﬀ
level w◦
i =s u p ( w ≥ 0| ∗
i (w)=0)for which indeed  ∗
i (w)=0for w ≤ w◦
i and  ∗
i (w) > 0 for w>w ◦
i .
Afterwards, we calculate the cut-oﬀ levels for each taste type.
First, (1) is trivial from equation (2), since for w =0and choosing   =0it reduces to
Ui
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which is, given that utility is strictly decreasing in  ,o n l yp o s s i b l ei f ∗
i (0) = 0.
Second, (2) is trivial for w0 = w (since  ∗
i is, by deﬁnition, a map). We show it for w0 >wby
contradiction. Suppose not, thus, suppose w<w 0 and  ∗
i (w) > 0, but  ∗
i (w0)=0 .S i n c et y p ew chooses
 ∗
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which is equation (2) for   =0 . Similarly, since type w0 chooses  ∗
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which is equation (2) for   =  ∗




i (w) − k
³








i (w) − k
³






or, (given that there are no income eﬀects),
Ui (w( ∗
i (w) − k),  ∗
i (w)) ≥ Ui (w0 ( ∗
i (w) − k),  ∗
i (w)).
Given w<w 0, and given the preference technology, the last inequality is possible only if  ∗
i (w)=k>0.
Plugging in  ∗









which contradicts that utility is strictly decreasing in  ,a sa s s u m e di nA 2 .
Third, call w◦
i the cut-oﬀ level for taste type i ∈ N. Individuals with a lower w will not work, thus,
 ∗
i (w)=0for w ≤ w◦
i . Individuals with a higher w will choose to work, which, given the functional form of
preferences in A2 and the labour supply equilibrium for ELIE in (2), implies that  ∗
i (w) must correspond
with labour supply that maximizes individual utility, thus,  ∗
i (w)=wεαε
i for w>w ◦
i .T h ec u t - o ﬀ level can













, or, given A2, w◦
i solves



















which gives us w◦
i =
k1/ε(1+ε)1/ε
αi for each i ∈ N.
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